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Abstract
This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste
and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparent
resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is com-
plementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several
authors, for instance López de Sa (2008), Sundell (2011), Huvenes (2012),
Marques (2014a), and Marques and García-Carpintero (2014), have re-
cently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from
the accusation that it faces the problem of lost disagreement. These au-
thors have proposed that a proper account of the resilient disagreement
in the cases studied is to be achieved by an appeal to pragmatic pro-
cesses, and to conflicting non-doxastic attitudes. It is argued here that
the existing contextualist solutions are incomplete as they stand, and are
subject to objections because of this. A supplementation of contextual-
ism is offered, together with an explanation of why failed presuppositions
of commonality (López de Sa), disputes over the appropriateness of a
contextually salient standard (Sundell), and differences in non-doxastic
attitudes (Sundell, Huvenes, Marques and García-Carpintero) give rise to
conflicts. This paper claims that conflicts of attitudes are the reason why
people still have impressions of disagreement in spite of failed commonal-
ity presuppositions, that those conflicts drive metalinguistic disputes over
the selection of appropriate standards, and hence conflicting non-doxastic
attitudes demand an explanation that is independent from those context
dependent pragmatic processes. The paper further argues that the missing
explanation is two-fold: first, disagreement prevails where the properties
expressed by taste and value predicates are response-dependent proper-
ties, and, secondly, it prevails where those response-dependent properties
are involved in evolved systems of coordination that respond to evolution-
arily recurrent situations.
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1 Introduction
When people have disagreements about taste, or about aesthetic or moral val-
ues, what is their disagreement about? What explains the apparent fact that it
is legitimate for people to hold on to their views about the issue under discus-
sion? And what explains that the disagreements at stake are often resilient and
persistent? Is there an account of this kind of disagreement that can capture
both the seeming perspective dependence of a given domain, while respecting
at the same time the seeming resilience of disagreement?
In the recent debate that has opposed contextualists to relativists about
predicates of personal taste, aesthetics and morality, contextualists have tried to
resist objections raised by non-indexical contextualists and assessment-relativists
by adopting two distinct strategies. The first strategy is to argue that none of the
relativist positions now available fare better than contextualist ones.1 The sec-
ond strategy is to show how resilient disagreements are to be explained. On the
one hand, contextualists have appealed to a combination of pragmatic mecha-
nisms to account for these disagreements: presuppositions of commonality,2 and
to further metalinguistic considerations about the choice of salient standards.3
Contextualists have also added a more thorough explanation of the practical
dimension of the disagreements at stake, for instance appealing to conflicts of
non-doxastic attitudes.4 Neither of these approaches – the pragmatic or the
attitudinal – have been sufficiently developed so far. In this paper, I will indi-
cate what aspects are still wanting. What is required is an account that frames
both the pragmatic and the conative aspects within an explanation of inter-
subjective or group coordination. The paper further argues that the missing
account is two-fold: first, disagreement prevails where the properties expressed
by taste and value predicates are response-dependent properties, and, secondly,
it prevails where those response-dependent properties are involved in evolved
systems of coordination that respond to evolutionarily recurrent situations.
This paper is structured as follows. In §2, I present and indicate what is lack-
ing in the otherwise promising contextualist proposals mentioned here. Thus, in
§2.1, I show that appealing to presuppositions of commonality by itself is insuf-
ficient, because in other similar cases the awareness that a presupposition fails
dispels the impression of disagreement. In §2.2, I consider Sundell’s suggestion
that the disputes take place at a metalinguistic level, and that in some of the
relevant cases what is at stake is the choice of a salient standard. One problem
with this proposal is that we need a better understanding of how disputes of this
sort are to be adjudicated, and of what motivates speakers to pursue them. A
further problem for both pragmatic explanations is that we have the impression
that there are disagreements between subjects who are not part of the same con-
versational setting, or do not even interact in any form. Both presuppositions of
1See for instance Glanzberg (2007), Stojanovic (2007), Rosenkranz (2008), Schaffer (2009),
Coliva and Moruzzi (2012), and Marques (2014a,b).
2See López de Sa (2008), and Marques and García-Carpintero (2014).
3See Sundell (2011).
4See Sundell (2011), Huvenes (2012), Marques and García-Carpintero (2014).
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commonality and metalinguistic disputes seem to require that some interaction
exists. In §2.3, I raise a problem for solutions that rely on the incompatibility
of (pro) attitudes. The most plausible explanation for the source of conflict –
preclusion of joint satisfaction – would seem to fail to yield the desired result.
Nonetheless, I think these three proposals made on behalf of contextualism are
basically correct.
Section §3 offers the beginning of a solution. In §3.1, I suggest that we
should follow Lewis and Hume in treating practical agreements as solutions to
coordination problems. Disagreements would arise when people’s dispositions
are obstacles to coordination. The suggestion is supported by research on group
action and rationality. In §3.2, I offer a conjecture that can help to answer the
problems raised against contextualism. The main problems are, first, that we
have impressions of disagreement even where subjects do not share a conver-
sational setting, do not know of each other, and do not have common goals.
Second, we have impressions of disagreement even when the apparent disposi-
tions revealed in the disagreement can be satisfied. My conjecture is that the
kind of coordination problems that the different types of dispute pose are at the
root of our having, as humans, evolved to have the emotional responses we have,
to make value judgements about matters of taste, aesthetics or morality, and,
crucially, to hear conflicts in the expressions of different personal preferences.
This section reviews some research that corroborates this conjecture.
In section §4, I draw the consequences of the proposal offered here for the
current debate between contextualists and relativists. First, disagreement pre-
vails where the properties expressed by taste and value predicates are response-
dependent properties, and, secondly, it prevails where those response-dependent
properties are (i) de nobis;5 and (ii) involved in evolved systems of coordination
that respond to evolutionarily recurrent situations.
2 Contextualist Strategies
Why be a contextualist (also called ‘indexical relativist’ by Kölbel (2004)) in
the first place? There are good reasons for a relational metaphysical account of
the properties expressed by predicates like ‘is funny’, ‘is disgusting’, ‘is tasty’,
‘is beautiful’, ‘is good’, etc. It seems highly implausible that claims about, for
example, humor, taste, aesthetic value, and perhaps moral value, should be
independent of how people react to funny, disgusting, tasty, or beautiful things.
An analogy with other dispositional properties can be helpful in understand-
ing the motivation for a relational account of the relevant evaluative properties.
5De nobis are plural de se attitudes. Where de se attitudes are specific kind of attitudes or
mental states about oneself, de nobis attitudes are a specific kind of attitudes or mental states
about ourselves.There are well-known motivations for de se thought, and different theories
that try to accommodate what is essentially de se in thought. In Marques (2015), I draw a
parallel between de se and de nobis attitudes by showing that the same reasons that support
the existence of a distinctive kind of first-personal attitudes can be replicated for the first-
personal plural case.
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Recently, Cohen (2009) argued that a metaphysical view of this kind about col-
ors has a natural contextualist semantic implementation. Cohen draws attention
to the fact that a single color stimulus can produce multiple psychophysically
distinguishable perceptual effects in respect of color. He further adds that there
is no well-motivated reason for thinking that just one of those variants is veridi-
cal. Thus, he concludes, predicates like ‘red’ express relational properties, more
specifically “response-dependent” ones such as looking red to subjects of kind S
under circumstances K. By analogy with the color case, we can say that aes-
thetic and taste predicates – and perhaps moral predicates, express relational
properties. A predicate like ‘is tasty’, or ‘is disgusting’, uttered in context C,
expresses properties such as tasty for the perceivers relevant in context C un-
der the perceptual circumstances relevant in C, or simply tasty for the standard
relevant in C. For the rest of the paper, I will assume that a dispositional ac-
count of the properties expressed by many evaluative predicates is correct, and
that aesthetic, taste, humor, and moral predicates express relational properties.
Saying this is not settling who the “subjects of kind S” are for each relational
property. In some cases, one may expect universality (everyone) and in other
cases expectations of universality might be unjustified.
The connection between dispositionalism and semantic contextualism might
not be evident. It is arguable that dispositional theories of some properties
can fit an invariantist semantics, and that the color case is one such example.
Nonetheless, there is historical and anthropological evidence of the existence of
very wide variability in at least some of the things that people find tasty or
disgusting across cultures, places and historical periods. There is also evidence
of some considerable variability in some of the things that people would like to
forbid or permit on moral grounds across cultures, places and historical periods
(and the same can be said for some judgements of aesthetics, of humor, etc.)
This available evidence contrasts with the color case. In the latter case, the
existing variability is related at best with the precision and ‘fine granedness’ of
color terms (how many words for ‘blue’ are standardly used by speakers of a
language, say). Not so in the taste and moral cases.
It does not follow that any possible claims in matters of taste, or morality,
exhibit such variability, and the extent to which there is any variability at all may
vary between domains. Perhaps there is more variability in claims on matters of
taste, and less in morality. Concrete sociological, historical or anthropological
analysis would need to corroborate the actual degree to which such a variability
exists.
Speakers’ judgments and intuitions are normally used in favor of contextu-
alism in these domains, in particular judgments concerning:
(a) What is said;
(b) Whether what is said is true or false;
(c) On disagreement between people making different claims within any of
these domains
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Yet, the data on speaker’s intuitions is not, at least not conclusively, decisive
for contextualism, as relativist objections make clear. So, further arguments
must be provided to settle this discussion, preferably arguments that assume
some common ground with the relativists. By framing the discussion within a
broad dispositionalist metaphysical theory, I am sharing this common ground
with relativists.6
In the current debate about the meaning of predicates of personal taste and
other evaluative predicates, several authors have raised objections against con-
textualist approaches, mainly on the basis that contextualism misses intuitions
of disagreement that these writers show we have. The problem, as they ar-
gue, is that of lost disagreement. Thus, Kölbel (2004) argues on this basis for
what is usually called ‘moderate truth-relativism’ (also known as ‘non-indexical
contextualism’, by contrast with the more standard contextualist views). Egan
(2010), Lasersohn (2005) and MacFarlane (2014) have argued for another ver-
sion that can be called ‘assessment-relativism’. As this paper is not dedicated
to discussing the limitations that either form of relativism may have in account-
ing for disagreement, I will not explain the differences between these views.
The aim of this paper is to show that a contextualist can explain the resilient
cases of disagreement, and, in so doing, take the wind out of the relativist’s
sails. The remaining of this section reviews three ways for a contextualist to
secure disagreement: presuppositions of commonality, metalinguistic disputes
and conflicts of non-doxastic attitudes.
2.1 Presuppositions of Commonality
López de Sa (2008, 2014) defends contextualism (indexical relativism) from crit-
icism based on disagreement data by pointing out that the proper semantic
implementation of the proposal should envisage the presuppositions of com-
monality that assertions expressing judgments of taste carry. According to him,
the failure of these presuppositions accounts for the data. The main problem
with López de Sa’s proposal, as I see it, is that when presuppositions of the kind
he envisages fail, we do not feel that any relevant disagreement remains. This is
corroborated in the case of gradable adjectives like ‘rich’ or ‘tall’. But a strong
impression of disagreement is still felt even by semantically enlightened speakers,
which cannot be explained by semantically blind folk invariantist intuitions.
Consider the following exchange between Clarissa and Jennifer, both excel-
lent cooks with vast experience and good taste.7
1. (a) Clarissa: Cow’s tongue is disgusting.
6See for instance Egan (2012). The present paper can be seen as offering a justification for
maintaining the more classic dispositional theory, instead of the relativist modification offered
by Egan. In Marques (2015), I argue that Egan’s de se version of dispositionalism about
values fails to accommodate conflicting attitudes, and, given the nature of the theory, it also
fails to accommodate doxastic disagreement.
7The example honors Clarissa Dickson Wright and Jennifer Paterson, the Two Fat Ladies.
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(b) Jennifer: No, it’s not disgusting; it’s delicious.
People feel that Clarissa and Jennifer straightforwardly disagree. On contextu-
alist semantics, however, if the relevant standard of taste is subject-relative, in
their context the claims are equivalent to these:8
2. (a) Clarissa: Cow’s tongue is disgusting [given Clarissa’s standards].
(b) Jennifer: No, it’s not disgusting, it’s delicious [given Jennifer’s stan-
dards].
There seems to be no impression of disagreement in (2). In fact, as Kölbel
(2004) points out, now both speakers can rationally accept what the other has
said while keeping their respective assertions, unlike what seemed to be the case
in (1).
These are cases of what Egan (Egan, 2010, 251) calls first-personally com-
mitted (auto-centric) uses, to be distinguished from sympathetic (exocentric)
uses in which we ascribe tastes by adopting alien perspectives (‘that fodder
must be delicious’).
Yet, the contextualist acknowledges that there must be cases of pointless
disputes, where subjects have contrasting sensibilities. Subjects are thereby ei-
ther expressing different relational properties (or wrongly purporting to express
an inexistent one shared by both of them). (1) is an example of such a case of
a “faultless” dispute – one that does not involve any doxastic disagreement over
a unique context-dependent content that Clarissa accepts and Jennifer rejects.
But how will the contextualist explain the persisting intuitions of disagreement
concerning such cases?
López de Sa’s explanation (López de Sa, 2008, 304-305) appeals to presup-
positions of commonality. The relevant predicate “triggers the presupposition
that the participants in the conversation are similar” with respect to the rele-
vant standard. López de Sa assumes a Stalnakerian account of presuppositions
(cf. Stalnaker (2002)). On this account, presuppositions are requirements on
the “common ground” (the class of propositions that participants in the con-
versation take to be known by all, known to be known by all, etc) that may
be triggered by specific expressions or constructions. Utterances carrying the
presuppositions are not felicitous unless the common ground includes them, or,
if it does not, they are “accommodated” by the conversational participants, i.e.,
included in the common ground as a result of the utterance.
Impressions of disagreement in (1) are then explained because “in any non-
defective conversation. . . it would indeed be common ground” that the partici-
pants are relevantly alike. In such a conversation, one would be right and the
other wrong. Of course, in (1) the presupposition fails, and as a result both
claims are infelicitous. In other words, the impression of disagreement is to
be explained by the fact that the following conditional is true about (1): had
8Assuming subject-relative standards here plays a dialectical role. Many authors in the
literature assume subject-relative standards, and most objections to relativism focus on indi-
vidual standards of taste.
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Clarissa and Jennifer been in a felicitous context where the presupposition of a
common standard was met, then they would have disagreed.9
But impressions of disagreement in analogous cases also disappear, as wit-
nessed by the case of the vagueness-inducing relativity to “perspectives” or “ways
of drawing the line” for gradable adjectives.10 However, such impressions re-
main among the fully reflective in the case of judgments of taste like the ones
considered here. The comparison with gradable adjectives shows that the pre-
suppositional account does not help.
The next example (originally from Richard (2004)) suggests the indexicality
of gradable adjectives – adjectives that admit comparative and superlative de-
grees, intensifiers like ‘much’ and ‘very’, and so on. Imagine that Mary wins a
million dollar lottery. Didi is impressed; but for Naomi, a million dollars is not
much. Taking New Yorkers to be the relevant fields of comparison, they judge :
3. (a) Didi: Mary is rich.
(b) Naomi: Mary is not rich.
The information about differential standards of richness provided by context,
which accounts for the intuition that different contents are being affirmed and
denied in (3a) and (3b), can in some other cases be explicitly articulated in the
uttered sentence:
4. (a) Didi, as before: Mary is rich (given Didi’s standard).
(b) Naomi, as before: Mary is not rich (given Naomi’s standard).
This evidence can be handled by means of a contextualist proposal, follow-
ing suggestions about the semantics of gradable adjectives in the literature.
Assuming that speaker’s intentions play a crucial role in determining degree
significance, Didi and Naomi either do not disagree, or participate in an infe-
licitous conversation where presuppositions of commonality fail. The problem
for López de Sa’s proposal is that the impression of disagreement also vanishes
among semantically enlightened speakers in this case. However, his counterfac-
tual still applies: Didi and Naomi would be disagreeing, if they were speaking
in a felicitous context. Didi’s possible reply to (3b) illustrates this.
5. (a) Didi: Mary is rich given what counts as rich for me; I see that you
have a different perspective on these matters.
Therefore, what explains the impression of resilient disagreement between
Clarissa and Jennifer in (1) cannot be that a counterfactual of that sort ap-
plies. A proposal along the lines of López de Sa’s might be the beginning of
9Baker (2012) criticizes this proposal. He invokes three commonly accepted tests for pre-
suppositions (cf. von Fintel (2004)), and points out that they do not appear to support López
de Sa’s claims. For discussion, see Marques and García-Carpintero (2014); the presentation
of the discussion in this section summarizes our work in that paper.
10Kennedy (2007) and Kennedy and McNally (2010), for instance, argue for a contextualist
treatment for relative gradable adjectives such as “tall” or ‘rich”, although not for absolute
gradable adjectives like “spotted” or “full”. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this
out.
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an explanation of such a perception of disagreement. However, as (4)-(5) show,
the presence of presuppositions of commonality is not enough to explain the
perception of disagreement that remains even for the semantically enlightened
subjects who adopt a contextualist semantics for value predicates.11
2.2 Metalinguistic Disputes
Sundell (2011) advances a well-argued defense of contextualism for predicates
of personal taste and aesthetics that makes some progress with respect to the
position held by López de Sa. Sundell argues, on the one hand, that impressions
of disagreement or conflict as the ones we have with (1) also exist in the cases
where it is clear that the asserted sentences not only do not contradict each
other, but are in fact both true. On the other hand, by appealing to pragmatic
and metalinguistic processes, he shows how many of the disputes of this kind can
be analyzed as disputes over the selection or appropriateness of a contextually
salient standard. I am sympathetic to Sundell’s proposal, as I am to López de
Sa’s. But once more, as it stands, it is incomplete.
As indicated, a contextualist about the meaning of predicates of personal
taste (and other predicates) should acknowledge that the perception of disagree-
ment that is left in cases like (1) cannot be accounted for as a straightforward
case of doxastic disagreement. For present purposes, let us accept that when
two people doxastically disagree, the following inter-subjective doxastic attitude
incompatibility holds:
Doxastic Attitude Incompatibility If subject A’s attitude is correct,
then subject B’s attitude cannot be correct.12
The occurrence of doxastic disagreement justifies the disapproval of other
people’s doxastic attitudes. But the notion of doxastic disagreement does not
play any role in a contextualist account of the remaining impression of dis-
agreement between enlightened subjects in (1). Both utterances, Clarissa’s and
Jennifer’s, express true propositions. Now, as López de Sa suggests, the im-
pression of doxastic disagreement may be explained by errors about contextual
presuppositions. But once we acknowledge that those presuppositions fail, the
impression of disagreement should also vanish.
Thus, if in the following dialogue, Clarissa takes a visible male to be the
salient one referred to by ‘he’ in that context and Jennifer objects because she
takes the salient male to be the person the previous discourse was about, any
impression of doxastic disagreement vanishes when they become aware that they
have different referential presuppositions.
11It may be questioned that the impression of disagreement is anyway resilient in the dia-
logue between Clarissa and Jennifer even for semantically enlightened subjects, after Jennifer
says, for instance, “Cow’s tongue is delicious given what counts as delicious for me; I see
that you have different tastes.” Perhaps it is not consensual that there is a resilient sense of
disagreement, but I am taking as veridical the reports given by many people that even after a
qualification of this kind is made, they still perceive a conflict between Jennifer and Clarissa.
12For more on doxastic disagreement and exclusion, see Marques (2014a).
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6. (a) Clarissa: He is Scottish.
(b) Jennifer: He is not Scottish.
(c) Clarissa: He is Scottish, because the salient male I meant was not the
one you have in mind but that one. [pointing to the visible person]
It is naturally possible to feel a disagreement about a “metalinguistic” propo-
sition (concerning who is the salient male in the context, the referent of ‘he’),
especially if participants have common knowledge about the nationalities of the
visible male and the one previously spoken about, and Jennifer places a proper
emphasis on her token of ‘he’. In this case, Jennifer’s objection is similar to the
one metalinguistically expressed by (6c).
Sundell (2011) has resisted relativist’s disagreement-based arguments against
contextualist accounts. According to him, both intuitive impressions of disagree-
ment or conflict, and disagreement indicated by uses of denial, or metalinguistic
negation,13 are compatible with the absence of some forms of doxastic dis-
agreement. He argues that many intuitive impressions of disagreement can be
explained as cases of conflicting non-doxastic attitudes (p. 271), for instance,
those manifested in this variation over (1):
7. (a) Jennifer: I really like cow’s tongue.
(b) Clarissa: Well, I don’t like it!
(c) Clarissa: # Nope/Nuh uh, I don’t like it.
There is a perception of disagreement or conflict in (7a)-(7b), even though
it is clear that the contents asserted by Clarissa and Jennifer are consistent –
both are actually true. But Clarissa’s disagreement with Jennifer would not
have been felicitous if expressed via the denial in (7c). Disputes like that in
(7a)-(7b) should rather be explained by appealing to conflicting non-doxastic
attitudes.
As an improvement over the notions of substantial disagreement that he
discusses, Sundell proposes that we accept as (a kind of) disagreement “the
relation between speakers that licenses linguistic denial” (Sundell, 2011, 274).
Sundell gives us some examples that illustrate the variety of denial-licensing
disputes. They cover presupposition disagreement (illustrated with (6a)-(6c)
above), implicature, manner, character (after Kaplan (1989)), and finally con-
text disagreement.
Context disagreement can include cases where sentences like those in (3)
are uttered (Sundell, 2011, 278-279). Consider this variation of the example.
Adapting the point made by Barker (2002), we can imagine a case where Naomi
is visiting Athens, and is curious to know what nowadays counts as rich in
Greece. In reply, Didi utters (3a), ‘Mary is rich’. In so doing, Didi is giving
“some guidance concerning the relevant standard” for richness in Greece. Barker
considers these as metalinguistic uses of gradable adjectives, uses that “produce
a context-sharpening effect” (Barker, 2002, 1) (see also García-Carpintero (2008)
13See Horn (1989) and Carston (1998, 1999).
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for a similar discussion). If these uses exist, then we can conceive of a dispute
between Didi and Naomi that concerns what the relevant standard of richness
is in their context, a dispute which can be expressed by (3a) and (3b). In
other words, “if context sharpening is a commonly available mode of conveying
information, then a natural prediction is that such information is a possible
focus of dispute” (Sundell, 2011, 279).
There is however a further possible kind of context disagreement. Not only
can people dispute which is the contextually salient standard in a conversation,
speakers can also dispute which standard should be adopted, when none is set-
tled. There are two issues that need further explaining. One concerns the con-
textual disagreements where speakers dispute which contextual standard should
be selected. How are such disputes to be adjudicated? A second related issue
concerns rather what drives such disputes?
Presumably, there is nothing prior to some aesthetic disputes or disputes
over matters of taste about which standard to adopt when nothing in the con-
text settles a standard. There are no doubt culture-wide paradigms of beauty
that are part of the background of many aesthetic disputes, and likewise for dis-
cussions over matters of taste, etc. But culture-wide paradigms do not suffice
to resolve all such disputes. They cannot settle, for example, a disagreement
over who is more truthful to nature, William Turner or the pre-Raphaelites.
Where nothing prior settles a dispute, a plausible hypothesis to explain the
persistency of a disagreement is that in those cases conflicts of pro-attitudes
merge with contextual disagreements (discarding other explanations for persis-
tence, such as lack of knowledge of the nature of the dispute, of the relevant
background, individual stubbornness, etc.) In a dispute of the kind now contem-
plated, each speaker tries to impose her own standard as the salient standard of
the context, insofar as the speakers are motivated to push their own standard.
But why should anyone do so? In other words, why would anyone want her
own perspective on the things she appreciates (or doesn’t) to be the perspec-
tive that others also have about what they appreciate (or don’t)? If we assume
that there is reason to treat different perceptions of taste as equally veridical,
it becomes evident that an explanation of how these different perceptions can
ground conflicts is missing from most of the recent literature on these issues.
2.3 Conflict
Huvenes (2012) discusses examples similar to (7), ‘I like cow’s tongue’/ ‘Well,
I don’t!’. He considers whether examples of this kind (and others, like (1))
admit of linguistic denials, and other markers of disagreement like ‘that’s not
true’/‘that’s false’ or ‘I disagree’. He argues that considerations having to do
with disagreement do not undermine contextualism. Like Sundell, Huvenes also
considers that there are a variety of forms of disagreement. He tries to defend
the idea that two people can disagree, even if they both speak truthfully. These
are the cases like (7), where speakers voice their different dispositions towards
given foods. Huvenes mentions that the idea of appealing to conflicting pro-
attitudes, desires or preferences, is not original. His idea is to use the distinction
10
Stevenson (1963) made between “disagreement in belief” and “disagreement in
attitudes”, i.e, between doxastic and non-doxastic disagreement. Although the
idea of conflicting conative attitudes is assumed to play a role in conflicts over
evaluative matters in general, it is seldom explained.
The first chapter of Stevenson (1963) Facts and Values is dedicated to the
nature of ethical disagreement, and the book starts by drawing the above men-
tioned distinction between doxastic and conative attitude disagreement, a dis-
tinction that philosophers, but mostly meta-ethicists, have assumed to exist
ever since it was made. Expressivists (Stevenson (1963), Blackburn (1984) or
Gibbard (1990)), relativists (MacFarlane (2014), Egan (2012)), and contextu-
alists (Sundell (2011), Huvenes (2012), Marques and García-Carpintero (2014),
Marques (2015), etc.) all embrace it.
We are concerned with the possibility of conflicting conative attitudes ac-
counting for the resilient impressions of disagreement that most theorists argue
exist in the cases under consideration. How should conflicting attitudes be ex-
plained? Two hypotheses for the conditions under which attitudinal conflicts
occur have been put forward in the literature. The first condition is one of
subjective rationality, the second is one of satisfaction.
The rationality condition is what Kölbel as in mind when he describes dis-
agreements thus: “we could not rationally accept what the other has asserted
without changing our minds.” (Kölbel, 2004, 305) The nature of the modal-
ity would need elucidation. Moreover, attitudes that are not beliefs, i.e., are
non-doxastic, seem to raise further difficulties for a rationality constraint.
The satisfaction condition is what Stevenson has in mind with that sense
of disagreement that “involves an opposition of attitudes both of which cannot
be satisfied”. (Stevenson, 1963, 1-2) The two conditions can be summarized as
follows:
RATIONALITY It is not possible for an individual to rationally have
a pair of attitudes X and Y just in case there is an attitudinal conflict
between subjects A and B when A has attitude X and B has attitude Y .
SATISFACTION If a subject A’s attitude can be satisfied, then B’s
attitude cannot be satisfied.
We may however have reasons to doubt that RATIONALITY is true. It is
not clear whether it is ever irrational to have a pair of conative attitudes like
desires, or certain emotions (love and hate, fear and hope, say). In his Treatise,
Hume argued that
it is only in two senses, that any affection can be called unreasonable.
First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or
security, is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects,
which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in
action, we chuse means insufficient for the designed end, and deceive
ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is
neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient
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for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it.
(Hume, 1978, II,iii,3, p. 415)
Both senses support the idea that the “unreasonableness” of the passions
depends on the possibility of their satisfaction (whether their objects exist, and
whether the means to attain them are sufficient). If Hume is right, then the
individual rationality constraint for conative attitudes depends on an individual
satisfaction condition. It is hence conceivable that someone is “not unreasonable”
for having two attitudes X and Y , even if there is an attitudinal conflict between
A’s attitude X and B’s attitude Y . Since we are left with SATISFACTION as
the real condition on the rationality of attitudes, a question arises as to how it
impacts on the existence of inter-personal conflict.
For SATISFACTION to be an acceptable condition for conflict, more has to
be said about why certain pairs of attitudes, when held by two or more people,
give rise to conflicts. Simply mentioning that two attitudes cannot be both
satisfied will not account for many of the conflicts arising from the manifestation
of different dispositions. In other words, there are pairs of attitudes held by
different people that can be satisfied and nonetheless the people at stake seem
to be in conflict. If the conative attitudes expressed are like those conveyed
in (7) ‘I like cow’s tongue’, and these are strictly individual dispositions, then
clearly the attitudes conveyed can be both satisfied. Since both dispositions or
desires towards cow’s tongue can be satisfied – Jennifer can eat what she desires
and Clarissa can refrain from eating what she doesn’t desire – there seem to be
no grounds for those attitudes to be in conflict or incompatible, apart from the
fact that they are different.14
On the other hand, having different desires, or desiring different things,
can’t be a basis by itself for conflict or disagreement, as this example clearly
illustrates: Jennifer quite fancies Ferrán Adriá, but Clarissa fancies his brother
Albert instead. There’s no conflict there, surely. Difference in attitudes does
not establish conflict.
In what sense are Jennifer’s and Clarissa’s different dispositions towards
cow’s tongue in conflict? As long as Jennifer and Clarissa can concur in not
forcing their choices on each other, both can have their preferences satisfied. Yet
presumably we may still hear a disagreement in straightforward expressions of
preferences like (7). An appeal to different individual dispositions by itself does
not explain why even in this case we hear them disagreeing. If each of them is
expressing a personal preference, with no consequences for what the other will
eat, where is the remaining conflict?
14Schroeder (2008) criticizes several versions of expressivism for failing to explain, and
merely assuming, that pairs of different conative attitudes are incompatible, or inconsistent.
He says “I think that none of these looks remotely satisfactory as an expressivist explanation
of why ‘murdering is wrong’ and ‘murdering is not wrong’ are inconsistent. None answers
the basic question of what makes disapproval and tolerance of murdering inconsistent with
one another. Each posits that there are such mental states that are inconsistent with one
another, but none explains why”. (Schroeder, 2008, 587) I agree with Schroeder’s criticism
of expressivism. Contextualists and relativists alike should be careful not to make the same
mistake.
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Given that we have dismissed RATIONALITY, and that SATISFACTION
seems unsatisfactory if the attitudes at stake are purely first-personal singular,
it seems to follow that we can only read (7) as expressing conflict between two
people insofar as we see (7) as an expression of an expected common disposition
shared by Clarissa and Jennifer. And unless we have a good explanation of why
having the same dispositions matters we will neither be able to explain why
people with different desires, preferences, or dispositions, have incompatible
attitudes, nor will we be capable of explaining the role of conative attitudes in
conflicts about evaluative thought and discourse, for instance in cases like (1).15
A theorist that aims to account for evaluative dispositional properties should
answer several questions. (I) Are the dispositional properties first-order or
higher-order? (II) Are the dispositions first-personal singular or plural? And
(III) what is the nature of the dispositions at stake?
I am inclined to opt for the higher order nature of these dispositions, because
of examples of this sort: Suppose I have a terrible cold. I’ve lost my sense of
smell and taste during the time of the cold. I’m offered a dish that has been
prepared by the chef of my favorite restaurant. There’s nothing he cooks that
I don’t like, so although I have not tried this one dish, I am almost certain it
is delicious. But the dish does not taste like anything to me now (I have never
tried it, moreover). It is not incoherent to believe “this does not taste delicious
to me now, but it is delicious”. Mutatis mutandis for something cooked by a
hypothetical friend with terrible taste and poor hygiene habits. It is also, in
similar conditions, not incoherent to believe “this does not taste bad to me now,
but it is disgusting”. This speaks at least in favor calling ‘disgusting’/‘delicious’
to whatever my gustatory experience would be in ideal conditions, or at least
in normal conditions.
Are these dispositions first personal singular or plural? How can I general-
ize from the cook in one of my favorite restaurants and the hypothetical friend
with bad taste? Presumably my generalization encompasses not just why the
restaurant is good for me (in normal or ideal conditions), or why my friend has
terrible taste (for me in normal or ideal conditions) but for anyone who is suffi-
ciently like me in relevant respects (in constitution or in cultural background, or
whatever turns out to be the relevant respects). But there is a further possible
variation here, depending on which evaluative property is expressed: who ‘we’
designates may vary from a large group – possibly everybody, to a very small
group – oneself only. Finally, what is the nature of the dispositions at stake?
The attitudes at stake may be desires, but presumably they could be other more
primitive emotional reactions.
The hypothesis that ‘disgusting’ expresses higher-order plural dispositions,
and not just first-personal singular first-order dispositional responses seems to
be confirmed by Rozin and Fallon’s work:
The notion that disgusting items taste bad may be problematic.
Whereas most people have never tasted most things they find dis-
15For discussion and examples illustrating the need for a good theory of conflicting conative
attitudes, see Lewis (1989) and Marques (2015).
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gusting, they are convinced that these substances would taste bad.
Of course, bad refers not to sensory properties but to their inter-
pretation of them. Thus, even if ground dried cockroach tasted just
like sugar, if one knew it was cockroach, this particular sweet powder
would taste bad. . . It is the subject’s conception of the object, rather
than the sensory properties of the object, that primarily determines
the hedonic value. Although certain strong negative tastes (e.g.,
bitter tastes) may not be reversible by manipulation of the object
source or context, we suspect that any positive taste can be reversed
by contextual or object information. (Rozin and Fallon, 1987, 24)
Now, David Lewis (1989) offers a schematic definition of what a value is:
[S]omething of the appropriate category is a value if and only if we
would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it. (Lewis, 1989,
68)
To value something is, for Lewis, to be in a certain sort of motivational
mental state: to desire to desire it. This guarantees the internalist connection
between value and motivation. Values are the things that we are disposed to
desire to desire in certain circumstances. There are two categories of such things:
the states of the world we desire to be the case, i.e., the propositions we desire
to be true. These are de dicto desires. And we also desire to be in a certain
way. These are de se desires. Lewis’s dispositionalist theory fits well with the
kind of relational account of evaluative properties described by analogy with
the color case in §2. On this theory, to find that cow’s tongue is tasty is to be
disposed in the right way towards cow’s tongue, i.e., it is to value having pleasant
gustatory experiences when eating cow’s tongue. And to find that cow’s tongue
is disgusting is to be disposed in the right way against cow’s tongue, i.e., to
value not being in contact with cow’s tongue.
On the Lewisian theory, the evaluative property expressed involves the rele-
vant group to which the speaker belongs. It is, if we want, a first-person plural
secondary property, or de nobis secondary property. The theory offers further
advantages. It is cognitivist, since it accounts for the evaluative property ex-
pressed by the value predicate or word – and it can be true or false that cow’s
tongue is tasty (or disgusting), and even that Jennifer (or Clarissa) can be mis-
taken about cow’s tongue being tasty or not. At the same time, the theory is
sufficiently subjectivist and dependent on people’s desires to accommodate the
perceived importance of conative attitudes in disputes of taste.16
16Anonymous referees pointed out that there seems to be a difference between clearly eval-
uative predicates (moral terms for instance) and many taste predicates of the kind discussed
here. Although we may expect convergence, they suggested, it would not be plausible to
claim that delicious’ or ‘disgusting’ express de nobis dispositional properties. I admit that
there may be some cases where apparent taste predicates express first-personal singular, i.e.,
de se properties: a disposition to have a certain response or reaction in the presence of certain
substances. The present account can be seen as defending an outline of the conditions a theory
must satisfy if it is to be evaluative and to allow for conflict and disagreement. Singular de
se dispositional properties can still be evaluative, but not allow for conflict or disagreement.
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Group membership for the purposes of identifying the relevant evaluative
properties expressed by value terms cannot be the sort of thing that depends
exclusively on one’s occurring desires. One may be mistaken at a given moment
about one’s overall dispositions, and one’s occurring desires may be affected by
extraneous causes. If that occurs in the personal case, a fortiori it can happen
in the first-person plural case, and one may be mistaken at any given time
about what one’s group values. Group identity and membership cannot depend
exclusively on one’s conversational interlocutors at a given moment. Because of
this, what we (i.e., me and people sufficiently like me in the relevant respects)
find delicious or disgusting is not determined by intra-conversational contextual
factors, or at least, not entirely.
If the disagreement in (1), as in (7), results from conflicting dispositions and
is about which standard should be adopted, what exactly drives Clarissa and
Jennifer to try to impose their own standard? The previous paragraph indicates
various ways the “selection of a standard” or a “dispute over a standard” can
take place: people may be mistaken about what standards they actually endorse,
they may be mistaken about group membership (who are ‘we”) or it may simply
be indeterminate who “we” are, or how “we” are to respond in ideal conditions.
If and when subjects are disputing which standard should be adopted, they are
disputing what they collectively, should be disposed to (dis)value.
To repeat, on a dispositional account of value along the lines of Lewis’s, a
standard of taste is a kind of dispositional property, the disposition to value
certain things. The dispositions at stake are first-person plural. This should
yield the desired result. Clarissa finds cow’s tongue disgusting. The theory
should ascribe to her the disposition to value, i.e., to desire that we desire not to
eat cow’s tongue. Jennifer, however, desires that we desire to eat cow’s tongue.
Clarissa and Jennifer’s desires amount to a disagreement in attitudes because
they cannot be jointly satisfied at the same world.
A remaining question is the following: Why does it matter that people share
a common value standard? In particular, why does a shared standard matter
for tasty or disgusting, but not for fancies? The next section tries to offer an
answer to this question, relying on the role of coordination on the evolution of
the relevant dispositions.
3 Coordination
The beginning of a solution should take coordination into account. Coordination
plays a role in a different sense of agreement to the ones discussed so far – namely,
in the sense of an agreement as a convention. For Lewis (1969), conventions are
solutions to coordination problems. Lewis follows Hume’s account of convention
and agreement in the Treatise:
It is only a general sense of common interest. . . I observe, that
Singular first-order de se dispositional properties will not be evaluative nor allow for conflict
or disagreement.
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it will be to my interest [e.g.] to leave another in the possession of
his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to
me. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed and
is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior.
(Hume, 1978, III.ii.2, p. 490)
What connects coordination with the kind of de nobis dispositions claimed
to central in evaluative properties?
Bacharach (2006) and Gold and Sudgen (2007) have done considerable work
on the role of first-personal plural intentions in decision-theoretic reasoning ir-
reducibly involving groups with which agents identify.17 These dispositions are
hence essential for group cohesion. Let us call them “de nobis dispositions”.
When Clarissa and Jennifer have de nobis dispositions, there is an increased
probability that their actions will be coordinated with respect to an indefinite
plurality of projects. An explicit indication that the presupposition of common-
ality (see López de Sa (2008)) fails, as in a metalinguistic expression of disagree-
ment over the relevant standard (see Sundell (2011)), manifests the absence of
such common de nobis dispositions, and it may undermine group cohesion. This
is the practical aspect that is missing in other semantically similar cases, such
as the disagreement about being rich, or who ‘he’ refers to. And it explains
where the conflict of attitudes arises.
I next offer a conjecture as to why we have such de nobis dispositions.
3.1 A Conjecture
The conjecture advanced here involves various components. The first is a com-
monly shared assumption among evolutionary cognitive scientists, namely that
various kinds of coordination problems are at the root of our having, as humans,
evolved to have the dispositions we have. The second component connects this
evolutionary assumption with dispositional theories of value, such as Lewis’s.
As a result, value judgements about matters of taste, aesthetics or morality
are such that they both express dispositional properties and, crucially, reveal
conflicts when dispositions vary. The present conjecture seems to be confirmed
by research in biology, evolutionary psychology and anthropology. The conjec-
ture, to be clear, is that our preference for some converging dispositions, and
our aversion to some diverging dispositions, has an evolutionary explanation
connected with finding needed solutions to recurrent coordination problems.
The conjecture is corroborated for instance by Tooby and Cosmides’s work.
Our distinctive capacity for cooperative behavior was, they have argued, evolu-
tionarily important for human survival. Tooby and Cosmides (2010) summarizes
many of their results. According to them, alliances pose a “series of adaptive
problems that selected for cognitive and motivational specializations for their
solution” (p. 200), where the two biggest obstacles to alliances are the problem
of free-riders and the problem of coordination. Coordination to achieve common
goals is necessary for coalitions, and it is also necessary that cooperators are not
17See also Marques and García-Carpintero (2014).
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outcompeted by free-riders. We have evolved both anti-free rider adaptations
and coordination adaptations. Tooby and Cosmides indicate that adaptations
for coordination include programs implementing
a theory of group mind; programs implementing a theory of in-
terests; programs implementing a theory of human nature; programs
for leadership and followership; the outrage system; theory of mind;
co-registration programs for solving common knowledge problems;
language; and an underlying species-typical system of situation rep-
resentation which frames issues in similar ways for different individ-
uals. (Tooby and Cosmides, 2010, 202)
Sharing the same evolved architecture, they claim, provides a partial foun-
dation for resolving the game theoretic problem of common knowledge with
finite cognitive resources. For cooperative action to be taken, evolved proce-
dures must exist for inducing or recognizing sufficient coordination in situation
representation.
One of the adaptations that contribute to coordination are our emotional
responses. Specific emotions are evolved systems of internal coordination, acti-
vated in response to evolutionarily recurrent situations such as danger, contam-
ination, conflict or pleasure.
More generally, there seems to be a psychophysics of mutual
coordination and coregistration, involving (for example) joint atten-
tion and mutual gaze, especially timed when salient new information
could be expected to activate emotional or evaluative responses in
one’s companions. The benefits of coregistration and mental coordi-
nation can explain (at least in part) an appetite for co-experiencing
(watching events is more pleasurable with friends and allies), the
motivation to share news with others, for emotional contagion, for
gravitation in groups toward common evaluations, for aversion to
dissonance in groups, for conformity, for mutual arousal to action
as with mobs (payoffs shift when others are coordinated with you),
and so on. (Tooby and Cosmides, 2010, 205)
The research about the evolution of taste and disgust, the education of taste,
and eating customs, illustrates this broad description of the importance of co-
ordination in human cognition. I mention briefly the case of what is disgusting,
after Rozin (1996) and Rozin and Fallon (1987). Here is a very short summary of
the explanation. As omnivores, humans have a very varied diet, but this means
that humans are at a high risk of consuming toxic substances. The evolution
of gustatory taste permits discriminating potentially edible things. According
to Rozin, disgust is the fear of incorporating an offending substance into one’s
body. The things that humans find disgusting things are, mostly, those coming
from animals (in particular, some animal parts, like tongues and other internal
organs). But there is a problem: it seems there is a wide variability in what is
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found disgusting (and conversely, tasty) from culture to culture, which suggests
that there is a crucial learning period. Elizabeth Cashdan (1994) argues that
there is indeed a sensitive period for learning about food in the first two to three
years of a child’s life. After three years, children’s tastes diminish drastically.
Coordinating eating habits with those of the immediate group may be one of
the first requirements for survival. It then becomes a way of identifying one’s
group and community.
Pinker (1997) discusses the significant case of food taboos. According to
him, food taboos indicate that the coordination of eating habits with those of
one’s group is important because it contributes to strengthen the cohesion of the
group. Being able to eat together may permit forming new alliances. Even the
holidays of many religions have as a central component rituals involving food
and “breaking bread together” (Pinker, 1997, 385).
Now, conflicts may occur in actual situations where coordination towards
common goals may be hindered – for instance, when Clarissa and Jennifer cannot
settle on what they should eat. On the other hand, conflicts may occur in
evolutionarily recurrent situations that have posed coordination problems, and
thus led to the selection of specific emotional responses (responses towards edible
things, towards dangerous or pleasurable situations, towards other people or
their actions).
The conjecture here advanced is that in cases of this kind – where sharing
the relevant dispositions has played a role in finding coordination solutions in
recurrent situations, the existence of divergent emotional responses is perceived
as signaling potential conflicts, and thus ground the conflict among conative
non-doxastic attitudes: not all of their desires will be satisfied.
The conjecture is illustrated with the case of tasty and disgusting things.
Being disposed to eat the same sort of things enables further cooperation and
altruistic behavior, and is more likely to lead to future benefits. Humans have
evolved to approve of others with similar dispositions, and have evolved to
disapprove of other’s dissonant dispositions. Not being disposed alike in some
relevant aspects may hinder further cooperation. The desires that concern the
benefits that result from others’ cooperative behavior towards oneself may fail
to be satisfied.
This research supports the claim that humans have a preference for con-
sonance and an aversion to dissonance in certain kinds of dispositions. Other
research supports the claim that certain modes of cognition are first-person plu-
ral or de nobis. Frith and Frith (2012) and Knoblich et al. (2011)have recently
reviewed the recent work in cognitive science and psychology on the various
“mechanisms of social cognition”. Among such mechanisms are, for instance,
empathy or emotional contagion that permit alignment of representations, as
well as forward modeling that allows the prediction of other’s behaviour. Some
of the neural mechanisms involved in the observation of others and in learn-
ing, at the implicit level, are association, reward, gaze following and mirroring.
Ongoing research on these mechanisms of social cognition reveals the role they
play in learning, cooperation, and language acquisition.
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4 Consequences
How does the conjecture integrate with (i) the dispositional account of values
a la Lewis that is being here assumed, and with (ii) a contextualist semantic
account of evaluative predicates in general?
The Lewisian theory is not only internalist and cognitivist, but it is also
naturalist. Values are dispositional states. If any dispositional theory is correct,
it has to fit with what the best theories of the natural and social sciences tell
us about the relevant kind of dispositions. Evolutionary psychologists’s work
on the evolution of altruism and cooperation, and on the evolution of the sense
of taste for instance, corroborate a dispositional theory, at least with respect to
taste properties. It may be that further research on the mechanisms of social
cognition will tell us more about the x character of such dispositions.
This paper started with a discussion of challenges to contextualist semantics.
The issue was whether a contextualist semantic account of evaluative predicates
like “tasty”, “disgusting” (and others more robust than taste predicates) can ac-
commodate and explain disagreement data. A contextualist semantics that
respects the metaphysical view of evaluative properties as secondary or disposi-
tional properties of the sort discussed here will allow for the possibility that two
speakers may be in dispute over different evaluative properties. One speaker
may express a property about group1 to which she belongs, that it values X,
and another speaker expresses a property about group2 to which she belongs,
that it does not value X. Both speakers may be speaking truly. Wasn’t this the
main objection to contextualist accounts, that there seems to be some sense of
disagreement left that cannot now be captured by the semantics? On a disposi-
tional theory like Lewis’s account, we have an explanation that covers doxastic
disagreements, as well as an explanation of conflicting desires, where such a
conflict exists if and when interlocutors are members of the same group. This
could however mean that the challenge of lost doxastic disagreement results in
a challenge of lost conflict of attitudes too. Or does it?
Contextualists have appealed to presuppositions of commonality to deal with
the challenge of lost disagreement – we suppose that our interlocutors are like us
in the relevant respects. They have appealed to metalinguistic disputes about
the selection of standards – even if we both speak truly, we may be anyway
engaged in a dispute over what standard should be implemented. And they
have moreover appealed to conflicting conative attitudes that anyway remain.
The main aim of this paper was to show the need to say more about these
kinds of explanation. What drives disputes over the selection of evaluative
standards, and why does it matter that common standards be accepted? What
makes it the case that a pair of conative attitudes are in conflict? What is the
role of coordination in finding common standards and in attitudinal conflicts?
Keeping in line with the naturalistic motivation for a dispositional account of
value properties, the paper offered a brief review of some the central research in
evolutionary psychology and cognitive science that can begin to fill in the blanks,
connecting dispositions that facilitate finding solutions to recurrent coordination
problems, on the one hand, with evaluative thought and discourse in general.
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Does this put us in a better position to answer the challenges of disagreement
and conflict?
On the contextualist account, Clarissa and Jennifer express distinct but
equally true propositions. This offers a semantic implementation of the rela-
tional account of the dispositional properties expressed by taste predicates. But
contextualists about predicates of taste and value face the challenge of explain-
ing how two people can accept different true propositions and anyway disagree.
The suggestion here offered tried to develop the proposals put forward by López
de Sá, Sundell, Huvenes, and Marques and García-Carpintero, by offering what
the appeals to presuppositions of commonality, metalinguistic disputes and con-
flicting non-doxastic attitudes were missing.
The impression that there is a doxastic disagreement could presumably be
explained by the existence of folk invariantist semantic intuitions. But there
seem to be resilient disagreements even where semantically informed speakers
like Clarissa and Jennifer still insist on uttering sentences like (1a) ‘Cow’s tongue
is disgusting’ and (1b) ‘No, it isn’t, it’s delicious!’ These can be presumably
explained as metalinguistic disagreements over the selection of an appropriate
standard, as Sundell proposes. What distinguishes cases like (1) from cases
where speakers simply express their individual preferences, like (7), is that the
former cases trigger presuppositions of commonality that the latter do not.
But other cases of presupposition failure do not generate disagreements; in
fact, learning that a presupposition fails usually dispels disagreements. We can
anyway assume that there is a conflict of attitudes remaining. If these attitudes
were simply the expression of individual desires, and since two people with
different personal desires can be both satisfied, it is hard to see what the cause of
the remaining conflict can be. I have offered a broader explanation of conflicting
conative attitudes, in line with a dispositional theory. This explanation however
still leaves us with a problem: if, on assumption, what Clarissa and Jennifer say
is true with respect to their respective standard (which concerns two distinct
groups), and if their non-doxastic attitudes are in conflict only if they concern
the same group, then we still do not have an explanation of the conflict of
attitudes.
In §2.3, I pointed to the fact that group membership cannot be the sort of
thing that depends exclusively on one’s occurring desires. One may anyway be
mistaken at a given moment about one’s overall dispositions, and one’s occurring
desires may be affected by extraneous causes. Moreover, one may be mistaken
at any given time about what one’s group values. Also, group identity and
membership cannot depend exclusively on one’s conversational interlocutors in
a context. It is not that whatever is a value is whatever the interlocutors in a
conversation are disposed to value. Context does contribute to determine which
value property is expressed in a context. As a simplified illustration, context
does determine whether by “tasty” the interlocutors mean tasty for people with
sophisticated gourmet training, or tasty for the typical north-European 3 year
old child. But a conversational context does not constitute the value property
itself. The property at stake, whatever it is, is whatever the relevant group is
disposed to value in the right conditions.
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The concern that contextualist explanations are limited to intracontextual
disputes does not arise straightforwardly. Because the relevant group’s identity,
membership and composition are not context-dependent matters, whether or not
there is a disagreement or a conflict of attitudes is not straightforwardly a result
of whether two people participate in the same conversation. Rather, it is a result
of whether their doxastic or conative attitudes are compatible or in conflict.
Finally, group identity and group membership may be indeterminate. This
indeterminacy, together with some indeterminacy concerning what we should
do in ideal conditions of full imaginative acquaintance, leaves ample room for
meaningful disputes about evaluative matters, and for metadisputes about what
values we should share.
In the previous section, I reviewed some work that shows the importance of
common evaluations for cooperative projects. The possibly variable extension
of a given group (and the indeterminacy of the group identity and extension in
question), together with “the benefits of coregistration and mental coordination”
can at bottom be the reason why, even when people have different standards,
they strive to establish a common ground, or, to put it another way, to ex-
tend group membership. Attitudinal conflicts can endure wherever there are
expectations concerning what we, together, should come to value.
This is, in summary, a rephrasing of Lewis’s conditionally relative view.
There is no absolute answer as to who we are: “What I mean to commit myself
to is conditionally relative: relative if need be, but absolute otherwise.” (Lewis,
1989, 85)
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